The Birth Of The Bitcoin-Dollar

Written September 21, 2021

You have probably heard of the petrodollar. You may not know the ins and outs, but you have heard the term in history class or on some podcast. In a very simple and reductive way, it is an abstract noun meant to show the political and military denomination of the United States’ dollar as the sole purchasing currency of oil. By creating the exclusive medium of exchange to be their dollar, be it in treasuries, bonds or cash, the United States could “quantitatively ease” their expanding monetary supply into the ever-demanded energy commodity that is oil.

The idea of tying your monetary system to an energy system might seem a bit odd at first, but consider the actual exchange of capital to be one of time spent earning the pay (working debt for credit capital) for a direct-product-of or service-based expression of the seller’s time. It might seem trite, but time is money; perhaps the truest commodity of the free market. So, by tying your hard-earned greenbacks to an energy-derived system, one can help preserve the scarcity of time spent earning.

This is the concept behind the numerous bimetallic standards the United States has applied before, during and after the revolution of 1776. One central bank and 195 years later, Richard Nixon closed the gold window, severing the stable tie of the dollar to the price of gold, and escorted us into the wide and open skies of fiat currency. What felt like high flying through the following decades was actually falling deeper and deeper into the cavernous hole of an ever-expanding debt balloon. Monetary growth expanded from $636 billion in January 1971 to an absurd $7.4 trillion by the time our fiat experiment caught up to us in the winter of 2007. The pressures of the cascading defaults of a Frankenstein financial creation hit in 2008; a monstrous body of illicit subprime mortgage speculation with the head of a eurodollar system liquidity squeeze.

By the time the news broke of a single hedge fund in the EU defaulting, the fears of insolvency among the system ran as far as New York City. Thirteen years ago this month, a bank run at the fractionally reserved Lehman Brothers drained the 161-year-old institution in a single afternoon. Why would issues with the credit of a single firm cause a global recession? Why would a bad trade for a hedge fund have this much effect on the United States dollar system, never mind the rest of the world’s currencies? The answers are concurrently abstract in exact psychological cause, for, after all, money is just a communications tool, but shockingly simple in an economical sense. Every market, of every kind, can be reduced to simple supply and demand. Every market, at the fundamental core, consists of buyers and sellers. So how did this assumed localized liquidity crisis occurring from a hedge fund default suddenly become a worldwide problem?

Not only did they not have the money to pay the debt in liquid reserves in the bank when the chickens came to roost, but they had already previously sold packaged shares of their debt around the global financial market. Larger hedge funds happily bought these compartmentalized debts in order to allow portions of their wealth to earn interest in the form of another firm’s debt. It was a nice gambit for a while; the smaller, less liquid companies got access to much needed credit, and the larger, more established companies got to earn slim but compounding percentages on assumed future profits. Everyone’s a winner, baby. But when one of those small debtors goes under, like in the case of the narrative of a local default due to some poor and over-leveraged mortgage plays, the larger firms are caught holding the realized loss of their now defaulted debt purchases; overnight that cheap and easy debt became very expensive.

But these days of wine-and-roses ponzi of repackaged, fractionalized debt-for-credit-now was not just enjoyed by a small chain of firms but rather the near entire financial system. The once healthy and strong tree was now a rotten log, eaten away from the inside by vicious, parasitic debtors and gluttonous, grubby creditors. A system-wide dollar liquidity crunch led to defaults and bank runs while, simultaneously, defaults and bank runs led to a system-wide dollar liquidity crunch. A financial crisis perfectly placed right between a Red and Blue president should sound awfully familiar.

But in 2007, there was Ben Bernanke, nominated by George W. Bush and later renominated by Barack Obama, to bail out the banking system that just got caught with their pants down. After gambling with homeowner’s debt via fractional reserve margin plays, the American banking system turned to the lender of last resort, the Federal Reserve, to generate liquidity by printing dollars. The future money printing savant Steven Mnuchin, then of OneWest Bank, profiteered on the bailouts, collecting massive service fees and executive bonuses for the very people and corporations that caused (see: benefited from) the recession in the first place. As the working class licked their wounds and prepared for winter, the Cantillionaires feasted on an eroded housing market and cheap index funds.

We have seen practically nothing but unmitigated growth in markets since these purple bailouts, that really only stood to further drive wealth inequality in the coming decade, and further yet exacerbated by the pandemic. The once unifying financial protests slowly faded into a divided, bipartisan culture clash, with the liberals blaming the Bush administration and the conservatives blaming Obama’s. In a sign of mutual-assured profits, when given the opportunity to prosecute Mnuchin of aforementioned fraud, then acting DA of California and now Vice President Kamala Harris declined to press any charges whatsoever, and, in fact, he later became the Secretary Treasurer only a decade later under President Trump.

So we can see how the violent monetary base expansion of the United States dollar could inflate away the purchasing power of an individual dollar, hurting savers and those with dollar-denominated positions, but why did this not hurt the United States’ purchasing power on a net basis? Why didn’t the massive inflation of dollars, from well under $1 trillion in 1971 to $10 trillion in 2012, bring the economy to its knees and relinquish economic reserve hegemony to China or Japan, our biggest debtors? By the time millions of Americans found themselves without homes and the Occupy Wall Street movement fizzled out, the Federal Reserve was back to business as usual, raising interest rates and resuming sales of bonds to foreign entities, and eventually, to itself. How were we able to fight off the mechanics of an unhinged money supply decreasing its demand?

The reality is, the United States never truly left an energy standard, we just simply switched from a gold-backed dollar system, to an oil-based dollar system. With the decree of 1971, the gold dollar was destroyed, and in its place, the petrodollar was born. American Imperialism has worn many clothes, red and blue cloth alike, but it has always been for one purpose: to make more money. The activity in the Middle East, starting with the marines landing in Beirut in 1958, mutated into a proxy war in Afghanistan between the USSR and the U.S. during the Cold War, and finally grew into a full-scale occupation in the summer of 1990 with Bush Senior’s directed invasion of Kuwait.

By occupying the oil-rich nations of the region, the United States enforced sole denomination of the market share of all petrol sales to foreign entities in dollars. This allowed the Fed to expand our monetary supply, slowly but surely over 50 years, with no apparent loss of demand. Oil-dependent countries across Eurasia were forced to buy dollars first, before then purchasing the precious petrol needed to power their industrial expansion. By 1990, the U.S. dollar system had expanded to $3 trillion dollars. Over the next 30 years, the United States had expanded itself with maneuvers in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and only now are we removing the last remaining military presence in Afghanistan; by the fall of 2021, the U.S. dollar system stood at $20 trillion.

So, why are we moving military presence out of the region now? Seems like an inappropriate lever to give up in a time when inflation has been acknowledged by retail and a pandemic disrupts supply chains and labor forces across the globe. Why would we want to jeopardize our world currency reserve status by removing our ability to prop up the dollar’s demand, as global interest rates sit at zero, and some, in fact, below it? A ponzi cannot simply be tapered, and we now find ourselves mere weeks away from smacking into our debt ceiling and risking default.

Historically, the United States has raised the debt ceiling countless times in recent memory, across all expressions of political spectrum in the three branches of government, and such are trained to expect the same. We have always had a place to put that new found supply of debt expansion, into the forced demands of a petrol-based dollar system. What makes this threat of default perhaps different from the 2008 crisis? It is nearly the same set up, with a diversified, debt-riddled real estate market on the brink of defaulting, with China’s Evergreen playing the role of the Lehman Brothers, causing a short-term deflationary pressure on the global dollar system. We know more printing is going to come, to prevent default of China’s real estate market, as well as prevent the U.S. from defaulting on its loans.

But it isn’t quite the same for a mathematically succinct reason; the compounding service on our near $29 trillion dollars of debt is now beyond the growth of the GDP of the country. We cannot simply raise interest rates due to this debt service, and yet with the acknowledgment of inflation running far beyond the assumed 2% per year, the once…